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ABSTRACT 
Perhaps be cause of the importance and visibility of s ome regulatory 
agencies and c ommissi ons , numerous observers have come to regard the 
administr ative f orm of regul ation as the ' ' logical ' ' or ' 'natural ' ' method 
of intervening in the econ omy or society . In f act , however , regul ation 
comes in a variety of forms . The administr ative form might seem all 
perv asive upon first consider ation , but a variety of legisl ative enactments 
cle arly regulatory in effect such as l arge portions of the tax code , direct 
government subsidies and so f orth suggest that delegation of legisl ative 
auth ority to administrative entities is, not so universal as is often 
assumed , More over , when viewed in hist orical perspe ctive, choice of 
bureaucratic implementation of regul atory programs d oes not obviously emerge 
as the ' ' logic al ' ' or ' ' natural ' ' method ,  at least n ot in the view of many 
political actors of the l ate nineteenth and e arly twentieth centuries , This 
paper surveys a heterogene ous body of literature on the subject of 
regulat ory origin in order to identify proposed expl anations f or legislative 
choice of administr ative f orms of regulation in preference t o  judicial 
enforcement of legisl ative en a ctments , The focus of the survey is on the 
choices m ade by legisl ators and the c onsiderations underlying their choices , 
Among the l atter are (1) beliefs in the inherent superiority of 
administr ative forms , (2) efforts to escape the costs, politic al and 
otherwise , of regul ating dire ctly , (3) ideologies supportive of delegation 
to administr at ors,  and (4) un certainty about the future oper ation of the 
regulatory process . These ide as are examined in an exploratory spirit ; no 
firm con clusions are drawn at this time . 
LF.GISLATIVE CHOICE OF RF.GULATORY FORMS :  
I .  LE.GAL PROCES S OR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS? 
I .  INTRODUCTION 
M orri s P .  Fl orina 
Some time ago I was a sked to prepare a paper addre s sing the stylized 
fact that Congre s s  invariably ch oose s to regulate economic a nd social life 
by creating agencies and commis sions rather than by adopting various market­
like mechanisms which have been di scu s sed in the economic s literature . 1 
Economist s of differing ideological hue s recognize the theoretical 
superiority of the latter , and even taking practical difficultie s int o  
account , many economist s believe that the polity sh ould curtail its reliance 
on ''command and control'' mode s of regulation and instead pursue 
collectively determined ends by shaping decentralized individual deci sions 
( Schultze , 1 97 7) ,  
De spite their nece s sity for the theoretical enterpri se , stylized 
fact s sh ould be handled with a modicum of caution, If regulation is defined 
a s  economic or social intervention by bureaucratic entities governed by the 
admini strative proce s s ,  the stylized fact i s  trivially true and the 
explanat ory que stion can be rephrased t o  ''Why regulate?112 If one adopt s a 
broader definition of regulation, however , the accuracy of the stylized fact 
is problematic . P osner , for example, define s economic regulation to refer 
'• • • •  to taxes and subsidies of all sort s a s  well a s  to explicit legislative 
and administrative control s  over rate s ,  entry , and other facet s of economic 
activity'' ( 1 97 4 ,  p .  3 3 5 ,  empha si s added).3 If the definition of economic 
regulation is expanded t o  include the entire corpus of government sub sidie s,  
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the tax c ode , direct statute s t o  be enforced via the legal system , etc, , the 
extent of Congre s si onal infatuation with regulatory agencie s i s  not clear , 
Even so,  we can still a sk why regulatory agencie s ever are chosen over 
market-like alternative s ,  or stated differently, under what conditions do 
legi slatures create agencies to command and contr ol rather than modify the 
incentives which underlie decentralized decisions? 
When re stated in the preceding form I find the que stion a very 
formidable one . In seeking t o  provide an answer at lea st three fields of 
knowled ge are relevant , First , one need s an acquaintance with the nature 
and characteri stics of the numerous pos sible regulat ory instrument s 
discus sed in the literature of modern economics and public ch oice . Second , 
one need s a political scientist' s under standing of our nati onal legi slature 
in order t o  theorize about the reactions of it s denizens t o  the numerous 
po s sible alternative s .  Third , one need s a rea sonable knowledge of the 
hist ory of regulatory politics in the United State s ,  a kind of knowledge not 
common to either modern political science or economics .  Consider that the 
ICC , whose experience ha s figured prominently in later political debate , was 
e stablished in 1 887 . The Congre s se s  of thi s era were different from those 
which e stablished the New Deal agencie s ,  which in turn were different from 
those which produced the ''new'' regulation of the 1 970 s ,  T o  mention j u st 
two of the relevant difference s ,  in 1 887 U . S .  Senator s were still chosen by 
state legi slature s ,  and 42 percent of the Representative s were fre shmen. In 
the 1 964-1976 Congre s se s  Senator s were almost aut omatically Presidential 
Candidate s ,  average H ou se seniority wa s in the neighborh ood of six term s ,  
and the ''incumbency advantage'' wa s a common topic of discu s sion, The New 
Deal Congre s se s  fell between the 1 880 s and 1970s  extremes, Even m ore 
important than such variations in member ship stability and experience are 
temporal change s in the internal power structure of Congre s s .  In the last 
quarter of the 1 9th Century the Congre s s  (especially the H ouse) made a 
pa s sable approach to party government , Strong party leader s controlled the 
flow of legislation, pr ominent committee post s were used a s  payoffs to the 
winning side in the leader ship conte st s ,  and the rank a nd file , unstable a s  
it wa s ,  found it self considerably more at the mercy of the leader ship f or 
achievement of their goals than contemporary Congre s smen could imagine , By 
the New Deal period the party leader ship had weakened considerably, 
committee government wa s in full flower , and seniority was the key to 
Congre s sional advancement and succe s s ,  B y  the late 1 96 0 s  the party 
leader ship had weakened even further, committee s were be ginning t o  feel the 
pre s sure s of their component subc ommittee s ,  and the individual member had 
become beholden t o  no one out side his di strict (D odd and Sch ott , 1 97 9 ,  
Ch s , 3 , 4) . 
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If we believe , a s  I d o ,  that institutions matter, the changing 
character of our national legi slature sugge st s that our theorizing about its 
ch oice of policy instrument s sh ould proceed against a backdrop of hist orical 
awarene s s .  Admittedly there is a danger here . While a model which ignores 
the detail of the legi slative proce s s  may be inherently incapable of 
enlightening us about legi slative outcome s ,  a model which incorporate s too 
much detail may provide a good accounting of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1 970 (OSHA), but not of the Federal Communications Act of 193 4  
(FCC), or the Inter state Commerce Act of 1 887 ( ICC) .  
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There is yet another rea son to bear in mind the hist ory of 
regulatory politics in the U nited State s ,  Though social scientist s he sitate 
to admit hi st orical experience a s  an explanatory factor in their model s ,  the 
regulatory debate at any particular time clearly reflect s hist orical 
experience . We can translate the relevant considerations int o  more 
congenial term s the use of hist orical experience to reduce uncertainty, 
for example -- but current calculations incorporate hi st orical experience 
just the same , In particular , the fact that politicians have data (or think 
they have) on the workings of some type s of policy instrument s but not 
other s ,  might be expected t o  introduce certain a symmetrie s int o  their 
calculation s .  
Thu s ,  i n  preparing this paper I began b y  studying the politics 
leading up t o  the Inter state Commerce Act and worked f orward in an attempt 
to identify real world c onsiderations relevant t o  Congre s sional ch oice of 
regulat ory instrument s .  After immer sion in the literature , however , I 
reached the j ud gment that the stylized fact which provide s the starting 
point for this paper conflate s two stylized fact s each de serving of 
attention. The a s sertion that Congre s s  ''almost alway s'' empower s 
regulatory agencies to promulgate rules and standard s rather than create 
market-like arrangement s ,  a s serts first that Congre s s  e schews the u se of 
instrument s which could more efficiently and les s  coercively achieve the 
intended goal , and second , that C ongre s s  delegates power t o  regulatory 
agencies rather than pas s  laws and allow the courts t o  oversee their 
enforcement . 
Consider that Congre s s  purportedly e stablished the ICC t o  deal with 
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problems arising from cartelization of the railroad indu stry, then three 
year s later pa s sed the Sherman Act , purportedly to deal with similar 
problems . Sherman, however wa s to be enf orced by the C ourt s ,  though the 
Attorney General was charged with initiating pro secutions . 4 Moving beyond 
economic regulation, some critics of current safety and health regulation 
argue that Congre s s  could clarify the law s of liability , specify formula s 
f or determining appropriate damage s ,  and leave matter s t o  t ort law rather 
than to regulat ory agencie s .  I n  the domain of civil rights the law could be 
implemented and enf orced via litigation by individual s and cla s se s  of 
individuals rather than by federal commi s sion s ,  Even environmental 
regulation doe s  not require bureaucratic implementati on. Congre s s  
theoretically c ould implement a full-blown emi s si ons charge system with out 
resort to a ny bureaucratic entity : specialized staff c ould determine 
charge s ,  pollution source s could calculate their own bill s ,  and the IRS 
c ould audit some fraction of the returns . Why is such a modified h onor 
system deemed acceptable for collecting income taxe s ,  but not el sewhere? 
C onsiderations like the foregoing led me to divide the question 
posed earlier . Rather than a sk under what conditions legi slature s opt for 
bureaucratic c ommand and control over the u se of incentive s ,  let us a sk the 
dual que stions , ( 1) under what conditions do legi slature s opt for command 
a nd c ontr ol rather than incentives,  and (2) under what conditions do 
legi slature s create agencie s t o  do the commanding and controlling rather 
than utilize the legal proce s s?5 F or a number of rea sons I have chosen t o
begin with the second que stion. For one thing , it ha s temporal priority . 
A s  mentioned , the ICA and Sherman Act s were pa s sed only three years apart , 
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the creation of a commissi on wa s a maj or part of the battle surrounding 
pa s sage of the ICA , and the perceived problem s (e . g .  monopoly , ' 'de structive 
competition ' ') were not those which have given rise to modern sugge sted 
schemes f or utilizing private incentives ,  (Even if they had been, Pigou was 
a mere stripling of 10 , and no m odern public ch oice theorist had yet been 
born.) The actors of the time took f or granted that commmand and control 
was the policy instrument ; the conflict s arose over the extent of command 
and c ontr ol ,  and the identity of those who would exercise it , 6 
A second rea son for beginning with the question of legi slative v.  
administrative form s of government intervention stem s from the current 
relevance of this que stion, At the present time our society is witne s s  t o  a 
wide spread debate about the existing regulatory order . In c ontrast t o  the 
academic debate , however, the political debate revolves les s  around the 
que stion of regulatory instrument s than around the very legitimacy of 
government intervention (I detect little or no popular demand f or 
substituting emi s sions taxe s f or EPA or even for replacing OSHA with a clear 
and t oothy liability law) . So, alth ough thinking of pos sible replacement s 
for c ommand and contr ol regulation warms the heart s of economist s ,  I will 
stick closer to the political debate and begin with the question of why 
bureaucrats are given that control in the first place . 
In the next section of thi s paper I offer some general ob servations 
about the literature on regulat ory origin, The third section contains the 
intended contribution of the paper. In that section I outline a number of 
model s ba sed on considerations present in the empirical literature on 
regulatory origin. 
II . TIIE L ITERATURE ON REGULATORY ORIGIN 
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This literature is both extensive and heterogeneous, It range s from 
the detailed bi ographies and ca se studies of hist orians (eg, Na sh , 1 955) t o  
the second order conditions of Peltzman' s REGULATOR (Peltzman, 1 976) •7 
De spite it s extent and diver sity , however , the literature contains little 
that is systematic on the form which regulation take s (ie, legal v.  
admini strative), or on the instrument s through which regulation occur s (ie, 
command a nd c ontrol v. incentive-ba sed mechanism s), Only an occasional 
article (eg, Buchanan and Tullock , 1 975) c onstitute s an exception, In fact , 
it is probably fair to say that the literature on regulat ory origin contains 
little that is systematic at all, The literature show s substantial 
agreement on a general, if obviou s ,  proposition, namely that regulation 
occur s when ''political pre s sure'' (political scienti st s and hist orians) or 
''demand'' (economist s) becomes sufficiently strong, Unfortunately , the 
literature sugge st s little of a more preci se nature that would enable us to 
identify such critical juncture s in any real world situation, 
The overarching question in the literature on regulatory origin 
appear s t o  be ''who wanted it and who fought it?'' Hist orians answer by 
naming individuals and group s ,  while economist s answer by characterizing 
individuals and groups in term s of their po sitions in the economy, but both 
are dealing with the same ba sic que stion. In constructing the re search 
agenda around that que stion, however, real difficultie s emerge, The method 
of the historians is t o  examine the record to see who said a nd wrote what . 
Kolko (1965) ,  for example , advance s an interpretation of the origin of the 
ICC which Chica go economist s would find congenial . After reading letter s ,  
speeche s,  material s i n  railroad magazine s ,  etc, Kolko conclude s that the 
railroads de signed a nd supported regulation a s  a means of advancing their 
corporate intere st s . 8 Kolko' s thesi s  i s  provocative and the supporting
materials at fist c onvincing , but how is one to know what proportion of the 
univer se of relevant data he ha s examined? Other historians (Martin, 1 97 4; 
Purcell, 1 967) argue that Kolko has overlooked letter s,  speeche s,  and 
materials in railroad magazine s which do not support hi s thesi s .  Their 
evidence too seems convincing , at lea st sufficiently so t o  rai se d oubt s 
about K olko' s thesi s .  
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Even if we p o s se s sed the univer se of speeche s,  letter s,  and other 
published material s ,  and could tabulate support and oppo sition to regulation 
on the part of variou s groups and intere st s ,  what would the data imply? In 
my opinion, not very much, Statement s of support or opposition are 
typically relative statement s, In the ab sence of full knowledge of the 
context in which they occur , they tell us little about the complete 
preference s of the relevant actors, In the case of the I C C ,  for example, 
the literature abounds in sugge stions that railroad intere st s supported 
various national regulation proposals in order to head off other , les s  
de sirable, but not unlikely pos sibilities, In the decade prior to the 
pa s sage of the Inter state Commerce Act more than 150 bills providing f or 
some degree of federal regulation of the railroads had been introduced in 
Congre s s ,  and four had pa s sed one h ou se .  Twenty-five state s had s ome kind 
of railroad commission at the time, and in all state s the c ourt s exerci sed 
some contr ol of the railroad s which were considered c ommon carrier s under 
the common law, When the Supreme C ourt handed down it s Wabash decision in 
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1 886 , invalidating state regulation of inter state railroad s ,  it i s  
under standable that some railroad executives might have anticipated renewed 
pre s sure for federal regulation, That they opted t o  work on channeling that 
pre s sure rather than be blown away by it doe s  not indicate that federal 
regulation wa s their optimum optimorunt, The full ambiguity of the situation 
may be seen via a simple illu stration , 
Imagine a legi slature debating whether or not t o  regulate an 
industry or sect or, and whether to regulate by a legi slative enactment (L) 
t o  be enforced in the court s ,  or by establishment of an agency (A) empowered 
t o  i s sue administrative directives .  Logically, a group might have any of 
six pos sible preference orderings over the two regulat ory proposals and the 
status quo of no regulation (N). The se are 
1 
L 
A 
N 
� 
A 
L 
N 
N N 
L A 
A L 
L 
N 
A 
f 
A 
N 
L 
Kolko argue s that ordering s 1 and 2 ,  especially 2 ,  characterize railroad 
preference s in 1 887 . The indu stry needed regulation because of ''ruinous 
competition''; ''only'' the form it would take was cause for disagreement . 
Most of the traditional account s su gge st that ordering 6 de scribed railroad 
preference s ,  A friendly commission such a s  that provided f or in the Senate 
bill (and th o se existing in many state s) could advance railroad interest s ,  
but a stern law such a s  that embodied in the H ou se bill wa s bitterly 
oppo sed . Ordering s 3 and 4 might de scribe the preference s of intere st s 
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happy with the exi sting situation, eg , Standard Oil in 1 886 ,9 The point of 
all this i s  that relative preferences between A and L provide little 
information about the complete preference orderings of the act or . A letter 
or speech from a railroad executive advocating the Senate' s commis sion could 
be made by one who held ordering 2 or 4 or 6 ,  and in and of itself 
constitute s little ba si s for inferring that railroad regulation wa s a 
conspiracy foisted on the country by the regulatee s ,  
In contra st to the method of the hist orians, the method of the 
economist s i s  t o  infer support and oppo sition t o  regulation from the 
incidence of regulatory benefit s and burdens , This meth odology is at lea st 
a s  problematic a s  that of the hist orians , With out knowled ge of the discount 
rate s of various political act or s it i s  doubtful that incidence patterns 
thirty years after the fact sugge st much about the original motivations for 
regulation. Given the popular presumption of myopic politicians it i s  
tempting to examine the incidence of benefit s and c o st s  i n  the immediate 
1 0  aftermath of the regulation, but i t  i s  not obviou s that politicians'
c onstituent s who provide political support are similarly myopic , Regulation 
i s  a proce s s ,  not a one- shot di sbur sement of benefits and c o st s ,  and diverse 
political act or s must calculate their anticipated returns a s  that proce s s  
unf old s i n  a n  uncertain future, Everyone may calculate carefully and 
c onscientiously, but the dice may simply come up wrong for some , Others may 
be f ortunate to use better model s in f orming their anticipations, For 
example, the record shows that regulation by commission was favored by 
various railroad intere st s as well as by various Progres sive element s who 
sought to bring the railroad s to heel . Discounting Kolko's suggestion that 
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the Progress ives were merely the running dogs of capitalism, there appear to 
be two explanations for these strange b edfellows , The f irst is  that there 
was a consona nce of interests among railroads , shippers, and consumers, a 
position held by some (Harbeson, 1 967) , but I daresay not one w ith which a 
maj ority of economists w ould a gr e e ,  The second poss ib il ity is that one or 
the other of the bedfellows m iscalculated , Their model of the expected 
1 1future operat ion of the r egulatory process was a poor one , 
One of the reasons m iscalculat ions occur is that leg islated 
regulat ion a nd real ized regulat i on are not ident ical. Thus , railroads which 
had worked sat isfact orily w ith state commiss ions of the Massachus etts type 
presumed that they c ould deal s im ilarly w ith a federal commiss ion of the 
proper sort; the Progress ives appear to have been rather less worldly about 
how intent m ight translate int o  reality. To c ite another example , a theory 
which demands that the actors of 1 887 accurately ant ic ipate the Supreme 
Court's emasculat ion of the ICC in the late 1 890s is probably one which 
demands too much of those actors , 1 2
None of the preced ing i s  t o  assert that explanations o f  regulatory 
or igin should be based on acc idents and m istakes;  quite the contrary . What 
pol itical actors want a nd what they attempt t o  do sh ould be the central 
elements of such explanat i ons , We should not f ixate ,  however , on regulatory 
outcomes; these should be the central focus of theories of the regulat ory 
process , Such theori es may or may not have much in common w ith theories of 
regulatory or igin, though I bel ieve that they will. In seeking t o  explain
regulatory or ig in, I bel ieve that we should model the calculat i ons made by
leg islators. Such calculat ions may be more or less long-term and more or 
1 2  
less uncerta in, They are made b y  actors who are agents of regulatory 
benefic iaries or bearers of regulatory cost s ,  rather than d irectly by 
benef ic iaries and c ost-bearers. And such calculat i ons take place in 
inst itut i onal contexts that may predictably alter the polit ical impact of 
regulatory benefits and burdens. All of this w ill hopefully become clear as 
this paper develops. 
The forego ing remarks are not int ended to deny the value of the 
l iterature on regulat ory ori gin, only to make evident its l im itat i ons , The 
econom ists are on'the right track in my view : we should attempt t o  model 
the pol itics of the regulat ory process v ia the s impl if ied deductive 
methodology that has proved so useful in other areas of interest , Future 
models, however, should be c onsiderably r icher than exist ing ones , and they 
sh ould focus on quest i ons l ike  choice of regulatory forms (legal v. 
adm inistrat ive) and regulatory instruments (c ommand and control v. 
incent ives-based schemes), The desired r ichness , needl ess, to  say, should 
reflect aspects of the st ory as t old by h ist orians and polit ical scient ists , 
however unsystemat ic the accounts may be , and however unfamil iar the 
language in which they are couched. 
In the spirit of the preced ing paragraph the discuss ion which 
f ollows examines var i ous consid erat i ons relevant to explaining why a 
leg islat ive maj ority intent upon a certain de gree of econom ic ,  political, or 
social c ontr ol would exerc ise that control by creat ing a regulat ory agency 
rather than by express ing its intent in a clear law and allow ing the legal 
process to take its c ourse. The f ocus is on the leg islat ors, whom I treat 
as max imiz ing actors, rather than passive r e gisters of outside demands , thus 
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altering the empha si s which pre sently exi st s in the small relevant 
literature. The considerations examined are those found in the empirical 
literature. I have attempted to i solate and clarify them, incorporate them 
in v ery simple model s of legi slative decision, and sugge st the kind s of 
conclusions they might produce. Thu s ,  what f ollow s is not one particular 
model pu shed t o  it s ultimate conclusions, but rather outline s for a number 
of models which eventually might be pushed to their logical conclusions. 
The s e  model s ,  incide ntally, are not guarant e ed to be mutually compatible, 
In fact , we are f ortunate to have some conflicting hypoth e s e s  which appear 
to be te stable in practice as w ell as in principle. 
III, LEGISLATIVE CHOICE OF RF.GULATORY FORMS 
This section explor e s  the subj ect of how legi slator s from single­
member di stricts view the choice between admini strative and legal forms of 
regulation. The model s to be outlined each focu s on a consideration that 
appears in the de scriptive literature on regulatory origin, In the intere st 
of cumulation I have ba sed the di scu s sion on the Shepsle-Weinga st (1980) 
model of legi slativ e deci si on, which is in turn a refinement and 
generalization of previous m odels which have appeared in the literatur e, 
The model posits that a legi slator elected by the j th di strict seeks  t o
maximize the f ollowing obj ective function: 
where b' > 0 ,  b'' < 0 
c' > O ,  c'' > 0 
(1) 
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Nj (x) r epre sent s  the net benefits to di strict j from a government activity , 
proj ect or policy, x, The latter is a s sumed t o  be a scalar measure of 
government involvement , so it might repr e sent the size of a proj ect , the 
level of income redi stribution, the scope of regulation, etc, bj (x)
summarize s  the benefits of the gov ernment activity to di strict j ,  while c1 j  
summarize s  direct government expenditur e s  on x which occur i n  di strict j ,  
Notice that the legi slator treat s the se a s  benefit s ,  ie, c1 c o st s  appear 
with a plus sign in the net benefit function, Expenditure s  in the district 
are thought to benefit the local economy, and with a few exceptions (e. g. 
chemical warfare t e sting grounds) are eagerly sought by repre sentative s, 
In contrast t o  c1 c o st s ,  c2 costs are treated a s  true cost s, The
latter repre sent the indirect or external cost s of the government activity 
which the j th di strict incurs. Such c o st s  might include de struction of 
farmland by a maj or water proj ect , higher price s  becaus e  of regulation, 
slower economic growth becaus e  of income redistribution, etc. Direct 
government expenditur e s  in other di strict s are summarized in the overall tax 
bill, T (x) of which di strict j pay s  a share , tj ' Indirect or external cost s 
on other di strict s are ignored by di strict j and its repr e sentative ,  a s  are 
the benefits which accrue t o  other districts. 
The preceding f ormulation may strike economi st s a s  peculiar, but it 
ha s a solid grounding in the empirical literature on C ongr e s sional deci sion 
making. 1 3  More over , the model provide s  a simple explanation f or such 
se emingly perver se phenomena a s  overwhelming support for patently 
inefficient government activitie s  (Weinga st , Shepsle ,  and J ohnsen; 1 981), 
Various types of policies can b e  analyzed a s  special ca s e s  of the ge neral 
formulation, In particular, source s as diverse a s  Green a nd Nader (197 3) 
and Weidenbaum ( 1 980) have noted that in the regulatory arena the direct 
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cost s of operating the regulatory proce s s  are trivial in compari son to the 
indirect or external c o st s  of regulation. If the legislator ignore s the 
former, (1) simplifies to (2) 
(2) 
Shepsle and Weingast (1980) note that in this ca se concavity of the benefit 
function and c onvexity of the cost function produce single-peaked net 
benefit functions ,  Thu s ,  a s suming sincere behavior by the legislator s ,  
application o f  Black's median dominance theorem yield s a majority rule 
equilibrium , namely the median of the individual legi slators' maxima, 
med max N . (x) . If a majority of legislat or s achieve their maxima at a level 
j x J 
of x > 0 ,  some po sitive level of regulation will pa s s  the legislature, 
Formulation (2) is exceedingly simple and yield s a determinate 
outcome, Like other related re sult s (eg .  Peltzman, 1 976) ,  however , ( 2) 
speak s only to the level or scale of regulation. The benefit and c o st term s 
are a s sumed t o  be pre sent value s of future benefit and c o st stream s .  Thu s ,  
que stions of regulatory form and instrument s ,  uncertainty, and other 
considerations are a s sumed t o  be resolved before writing d own (2). In what 
f ollow s I will attempt t o  step back a bit and break out some of the 
complications buried in the general formulation, 
Good Government Models 
Economist s make a ritualistic practice of kicking around the 
' 'public interest'' model of regulatory origin before settling d own t o  
serious analy si s o f  the subject . 1
'4 The political science-public 
administration ver sion of the public intere st model is the g o od government 
model . According t o  this m odel the admini strative proce s s  i s  inherently 
superior to judicial enforcement of legi slative enactment s .  Two principle 
advantage s stand out . 1 5  First , admini stration i s  supposedly c onducted by 
expert, non-political official s (or at least by well-meaning persons who 
have expert ,  non-political staff) who carry out the regulation as intended 
by C ongre s s ,  In c ontrast , dependence o n  the legal system entail s delay s ,  
prohibitive expense s ,  inconsi stency of legal interpretation acr o s s  
jurisdiction s ,  and so  f orth . Complaint s about manipulation of the legal 
system are by no means limited t o  the modern era. In Congres sional debate 
on the ICA , for example, numerous Congre s smen rejected the notion of an 
even-handed judicial proce s s ,  Among the comment s cited by Cushman (1941 , 
pp. 4 8-49) are these : 
Few indeed dare enter int o  litigation with railways • •  Those 
who can afford to fight the railway s are those u sually who enjoy 
their favor . (La Follette , Wisc ,) 
He stand s there alone, weak a nd poor and ignorant th ough he 
may be , with a ten-dollar ca se or a one-hundred-dollar ca se , He 
must make his own ca se against a wealthy corporation, He must do 
that, too, with out technical knowledge of the matter s litigated . 
He ha s no witne s se s who are better informed than himself,  The 
witne sse s  which must e stablish his care are the experts that 
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belong to the other side of the que stion, ( Hepburn, la,) 
Railroad s have employed statisticians and manager s and 
lawyer s to look up the statistics of thi s great transportation 
question from the railroad side of the ca se, But the people have 
never had a ny parties under their own contr ol or in their employ 
exclusively for the purpose of looking up the fact s of the 
transportation que stion from their side of the ca se .  That is 
j u st what this commissioner system will give t o  them 
(Peter s,  Kan.) 
The second advantage suppo sedly enj oyed by the admini strative 
proce s s  is the di scretion or flexibility that proce s s  permits, Rather than 
write an inflexible , detailed law , Congre s s  can state its intent in general 
terms and allow the agency or commission t o  fine-tune the law t o  fit 
changing social, economic and technological c onditions. A specific law 
which is appropriate today may become inappropriate given changing 
conditions, wherea s a flexible law can be interpreted so a s  t o  maintain the 
original level of regulation intended by Congre s s, 
These and other subsidiary argument s underlie the conclusion of the 
good government model , namely that legi slat or s should consider two net 
benefit functions, Aj (x) and Lj (x), which repre sent the net benefits from a 
level of regulation, x, carried out by the admini strative and legal 
proce s se s ,  respectively, and that A . (x) > L . ( x), The latter holds because
J J 
the aforementioned inflexibility , uncertainty, and slippage in the legal 
proce s s  force a greater di scounting of future benefits ,  thus yielding a 
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higher pre sent value f or Aj (x), 
Obviously, there i s  little in our hist orical experience with 
regulatory agencie s and c ommis sions t o  j ustify the benign view of them 
a s sumed in the good government model, In addition, the m odel implicitly 
a s sumes a c onsensus among the legi slat ors that i s  extremely unlikely .  Why 
sh ould all or a maj ority of legi slat ors prefer that the regulation be 
implemented exactly a s  adopted? The minority which prefer s les s  regulation 
might prefer that the legislation be j udicially sabotaged , and the minority 
which prefer s m ore might prefer to gamble that aggre s sive j ud ge s  will over-
extend the legi slation, There i s  little rea son t o  believe that all 
legislator s will have an aver sion t o  the posited greater uncertainty of the 
legal proce s s, Indeed , given hist orical experience there is little rea son 
t o  posit that the legal proce s s  i s  more uncertain, Certainly in 1 887 not 
everyone took that point of view, Cushman (1941 , p, 50) notes that 
Judge Reagan and his supporter s did not wish railroad regulation 
to be flexible. They wished it to be specific , rigid , and 
dra stic . They looked with di strust upon any agency t o  which 
might be c onfided a ny discretion in softening or lightening the 
f orce of these rigorous penal provisions, 
The Grange te stified before Congres s  to similar effect (Cu shman, 1 94 1 ,  p, 
50) . Uncertainty is clearly a relevant consideration in choosing between 
legal and admini strative f orm s of regulation, but the good government model 
make s highly unrealistic a s sumptions about the universality of reaotions t o  
uncertainty.  More general and m ore reasonable ways of bringing uncertainty 
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into the analysi s will be discus sed o n  the subsection on uncertainty model s 
below , 
There is a final problem with the good government model , Quite 
simply it doe s not explain why Congre s s  ever pa s se s  a specific law rather 
than hand off the specifics to an agency ,  Why is the IR S not empowered to 
set tax rate s and determine the other details of the tax code? Why are 
subsidy levels not alway s left to agencies to determine? In short, 
acceptance of the good government model would lead us to inquire why there 
are not even more numerous and more powerful agencie s and commis sions! 
Legislator Benefit Models 
In the substantive literature the most common explanation s for 
legislative choice of administrative form s of regulation focu s on the 
benefit s which accrue to legislator s a s  a result of delegation, Certainly 
legi slator s have political incentive s  to function a s  faithful agent s of 
their con stituent s ,  but the preference s of the agent and the principal are 
seldom identical .  Various features of real political proce s se s  create 
benefit s and costs for legi slator s that are not perceived a s  such by 
con stituent s .  Thu s ,  legi slator s may have induced preference s for certain 
type s of policy option s rather than other s where con stituent s might be 
indifferent, Moreover , other feature s  of the political proce s s  may create 
di sparities between the induced preference s of legi slator s over policy 
option s and the preference s of con stituent s subj ect to those options, Thus ,  
legislators may not choose exactly a s  their di strict s would in some form of 
direct democratic proce s s, Both line s of argument are common in the 
1 iterature, 
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1. Deci sion-Making Cost s 
Ab stract model s of the legi slative proce s s  presume that legi slator s 
have infinite time and patience and/or that legi slative decision s are made 
co stles sly and in stantaneously . In reality , of cour se , legislator s are 
human, They do not like screams and threat s and endles s  debate . In every 
se s sion there are hundred s of decision s to be made; time spent on any one 
competes with opportunities pre sented by other s, Moreover, time spent on 
deci sion-making may actually be politically counter-productive a s  
editorialist s and interest group spoke smen begin to complain about 
legislative delay s ,  stalemate, incapacity to govern, and so forth. 
Con sideration s like these have led many observer s ,  particularly lawyer s ,  to 
comment on the u se of administrative agencie s to cut legi slative deci sion 
co st s .  Often this observation goe s hand in hand with one pointing out the 
vaguene ss of regulatory mandate s .  A good example i s  provided b y  Judge 
Landis' discussion of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1 93 5 .  The 
Senate Bill provided for the outlawing of all holding companie s except where 
a provision of state public utilities law required them, In the House an 
amendment wa s added to permit the Fl'C to suspend the former provision when 
the exemption wa s found to be consistent with the public intere st, Landi s 
(193 8 ,  p .  56) write s with dismay: 
The 'House amendment , • , , turned over the whole burning i s sue of 
the future of the holding company in the public utility field to 
the Commis sion it self without any indication of what it should do 
with it other than that the public interest should be the guide 
for Commis sion action, It was obvious at once that, for the 
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C ommission ,  this was an impossible responsibility . It meant 
nothing less than that the Commission , rather than the C ongress , 
would become the focal point f or all the pressures and counter­
pressures that had kept the C ongress and the press at a white 
heat for months, Instead of the controversy being concluded , it 
would have been protracted interminably with the rooms of the 
Commission the place of the debate rather than the halls of the 
C ongress, 
It is easy to understand why legislators would just as soon n ot live 
in ''a white heat for months,'' Other things equal , passing the tough 
decisions on to someone else has much to recommend it, If things were 
always equal, however, everything would be delegated . C ongress d oes cho ose 
to take the ''white host'' over 90 percent reductions in vehicle emissions , 
and it d oes not empower the IR S to suspend the tax c ode when IR S determines 
such suspension to be in the public interest . The decision c osts 
explanation is clearly relevant , but not complete . 
2, Shift the Responsibility 
Many of those who discuss C ongressional delegation of power to 
regulatory agencies see more than a simple attempt t o  shift decision-making 
c osts ;  they see a deliberate attempt t o  shift political costs as well, W oll 
(1977, p .  1 7 3) comments in a section on administrative rule-making : 
A maj or reason f or the power of the bureaucracy in policy 
formulation is the frequent lack of congressional incentives t o  
adhere to the Schechter rule and establish explicit standards f or 
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administrative action , This is particularly true in the 
regulatory realm , an area involving political conflict that 
legislators often wish t o  avoid . C ongress is always willing t o  
deal rhetorically with problems requiring regulati on and with the 
area of regulatory reform but reul decisions on the part of the 
legislature will undoubtedly raise the ire of powerful pressure 
groups on one side or the other that sre affected by government 
regulation, 
By charging an agency with the implementation of a general regulatory 
mandate, legislators not only avoid the time and trouble of making specific 
decisions , they avoid or at least disguise their responsiblity for the 
c onsequences of the decisions ultimately made, Aggrieved c onstituents 
receive a sympathetic ear, a speech denouncing the independent commissioner, 
presidential appointee , or arbitrary bureaucrat, and a promise to look int o 
the matter, 
Essential to the ''shift the responsibility'' m odel is the 
presumption that the actual net benefits of regulation t o  the district 
differ systematically from the perceived net benefits stemming from the 
legislator's actions on the issue, This presumption turns out t o  have a 
rather interesting array of implications, 
Assume that legislators wish to maximize the net benefits from 
regulation for which they are held acc ountable, In accord with the ''shift 
the responsibility'' model , perceived responsibility varies between legal 
and administrative f orms of regulation, Specifically, 
where 
L . (x) 
J 
b � (x) - c � (x)
J J 
I will refer to the pair of inequalities ( 4) as the ''shift the 
responsibility'' or SR assumptions, The first embodies tho n otion that 
delegation dilutes the costs of regulation which constituents attribute t o  
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(4) 
legislative action, The second inequality embodies a similar assumption on 
benefits: if delegation enables legislat ors t o  avoid s ome blame, it seems 
reasonable that it should prevent them from claiming full credit as well . 
For a given level of regulation, x ,  a legislator prefers the 
administrative over the legal form if 
The general effects of the SR assumptions are visible in (5)1 ceteris 
paribus, a big perceptual slippage on the c ost side predisposes the 
(5) 
legislator toward the administrative f orm , whereas a big perceptual slippage 
on the benefit side predisposes him toward the legal form . Note, however , 
that in contrast to previous models the SR assumptions which produce 
condition (5) separate legislators into classes who differentially prefer 
the legal or administrative f orm . In order to pursue the description of 
these classes let us examine a special case of ( 4) where 
bj (x) = k 1bJ (x),
cj (x)
= 
k2cJ (x),
1 
1 
(This specific functional form is not critical t o  the discussion which 
follows; it merely provides an easily manipulable representation of the 
benefit and c ost slippages,) Under these c onditi ons (5) becomes (5'): 
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(5') 
From (5 ') we see that ceteris paribus, preferences for the administrative 
process over the legal process are enhanced by high costs from regulation 
and low benefits. Conversely , support for a law t o  be enforced by the 
courts should be most common among those legislators whose districts are 
high net beneficiaries under the proposed regulation, The SR effects are 
just tho special case of those mentioned earlier: an ability to shift blame 
(low k2) is c onducive t o  agency preferences , as is an ability to claim 
credit (high k1), 
A common theme in the literature on C ongress is that national policy 
making processes are structured so as t o  facilitate C ongressional credit-
claiming on the one hand , and blame-shifting on the other (eg, Mayhew , 1974, 
passim), What is the c onsequence of explicitly recognizing this 
institutional characteristic in the mod�l by assuming that k1 2 k2 in 
general? Under this condition , .!!.!! not losers from regulation (b; < cJ) 
prefer that the proposed regulation be implemented via the administrative 
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process, ie. 
Having a net loser district is sufficient but not necessary, of course, For 
example, a legislator for whom k1 = . 8  and k2 .4 would pref er the 
administrative over the legal implementation of the proposed regulation so 
long as its benefit/cost ratio was less than three, 
Summing up, the SR model has a variety of implications for the 
advocacy stage of the legislative process. First, we might expect to see 
widespread support for precise legislation to be enforced via ordinary court 
procedures where a large proportion of legislative districts genuinely 
benefit from the proposed regulation, Conversely, widespread support for a 
regulatory agency might make us suspicious about the scope of the 
anticipated benefits from regulation,16 A historical footnote: in 1 887 the 
Senate strongly supported a commission whereas the House held out for 
reliance on normal legal procedures. A possibility consistent with the SR 
model is that the proportion of loser states was greater than the proportion 
of loser Congressional districts under the proposed regulation, 
A second implication of the SR model is that conditions which 
facilitate credit-claiming and blame-shifting simultaneously facilitate 
preferences for regulatory agencies. This implication may have some bearing 
on the importance of interest group organization in the regulatory arena , 
Wilson (1 974), Stigler (1 971) and others have noted the relevance of the 
degree of concentration among regulatory beneficiaries and cost-bearers. 
Concentration would facilitate credit claiming in that an organized group 
with regularized channels of communication would be aware of Congressional 
action in setting up and overseeing an agency , For the same reason 
concentration would hinder blame-shifting since the group would be better 
able to penetrate the Congressional facade. Lack of concentration would 
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have the opposite effects. Members of an unorganized, inchoate group would 
be unlikely to see further than the agency overtly responsible for specific 
decisions. Legislators would not be blamed by such a group, but the agency 
would appropriate the political credit as well as the blame. 
All of the preceding relates to legislator preferences what they 
might advocate in the legislature. What would pass, however? In 
particular, what level of x would the legislature decide upon, and would 
they choose an administrative or legal form of implementation? 
In order to address the preceding questions let us think of each 
legislator as having two ideal proposals: 
mu Lj (x)
X 
The significance of these proposals emerges from a consideration of the 
standard amendment process (Riker, 1 95 8). Under that process a bill is 
proposed to alter the status quo, the bill is subject to amendment, a 
substitute to the bill is allowed, the substitute is also subject to 
amendment, the perfected substitute is voted against the perfected bill, and 
the latter is voted against the status quo, Schematically: 
SQ------�.Bill-------�Substitute 
t f 
Amendment Amendment s 
In the ca se of regulatory origin we can think of the status quo a s  no 
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regulation, The original bill proposes to regulate at some level either via 
an agency or the normal legal proces s, and amendment s t o  the bill propose 
increa se s or decrea se s in the level of regulation. The sub stitute bill 
proposes t o  regulate by the form not selected in the original bill , and 
amendment s t o  the sub stitute propose to alter the level of regulation 
provided f or in the sub stitute . Schematically, 1 7
jI< t 
No regulation----- {�} - {�} 
Under this kind of amendment procedure the penultimate vote in the 
legi slature i s  between 
• 
med max Lj (x) • L (x ) j x 
•• 
med max Aj (x) • A (x ) j x 
And if the winner provide s for a po sitive level of x, regulation occur s at 
that level in the winning f orm . 
Two natural que stions which arise at this point are, fir st , under 
•• • 
what conditions i s  x greater than x , and second ,  under what conditions 
doe s  A (x
••) defeat L (x
• > 11 8  I have not had the opportunity as yet to
explore these que stions at any great length . It turns out that in the 
•• • 
special ca se we have been examining ,  x L x : 
{b ; (x) - c; (x)
And 
kj lb; (x) - kj 2c; (x)
0 => 
, 
b .  (x) 
-T- = 1 
c j (x) 
, 
b. (x) 
0 => """T­
c j (x)
which given that bj (x) is concave in x and cj (x) c onvex in x implie s that
•• • 
xj L xj f or each legislator j .  This result is not general, however, 
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The answer t o  the second que stion appears t o  be that a wide variety 
of conditions will allow A (x
••
) t o  defeat L (x
•
). If we plot all 
legi slator' s net benefits at x
•• 
and x
• 
in a two dimensional space a s  
f ollow s ;  
* 
L. (x ) 
J 
28-a 
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Then A (x
••
) defeats L (x
•
) if a majority of the ordered pairs lie above the 
45 degree line through the origin , Clearly, given the general assumption 
that delegation facilitates blame-shifting more than it inhibits credit-
claiming (eg. k1 2 k2), the condition is not hard to meet. Of course, the 
amendment process we have assumed adds a great deal of structure to the 
situation. In a completely open majority rule process it would no doubt 
require stringent conditions to produce an equilibrium in the dual choice of 
regulatory level and form, though given the dichotomous conceptualization of 
the latter the situation will probably be less chaotic than the case of 
majority rule over a multidimensional policy space (McKelvey, 1 97 9). 
Summing up, I think it is clear that the SR model is a fruitful one 
to extend and explore. Its basic premise -- that delegation creates an 
altered perception of benefits and costs -- is widely accepted in the 
substantive literature, The implications of the model are rich and varied. 
From the standpoint of empirical research an especially nice feature of the 
SR model is that it makes no across-the-board prediction that legislators 
favor administrative over legal forms of regulation, as do many of the other 
models I have isolated, Instead the SR model identifies variables and 
conditions which affect legislator preference for regulatory forms, 
3 .  Legislative Rent-Seeking 
All the delegation models have in common the recognition that the 
real world of policy adoption and implementation is characterized by various 
kinds of frictions and imperfections. We have already seen that legislators 
have incentives to shift the costs of making decisions and to take advantage 
of imperfect information on the part of constituents by evading 
3 0  
responsibility for the consequences of policy decisions . In this subsection 
I will briefly note how additional considerations give rise to opportunities 
for legislators to appropriate rents generated by their policy choices . 
Regulation is not automatically and costlessly implemented . It is a 
continuing process characterized by a certain amount of conflict over 
interpretation and application of the regulatory mandate, and often by 
continuing efforts to modify that mandate . If the legislature writes a 
clear law containing the regulatory decision and charges the courts with 
enforcement, the demand for lawyers' services is thereby increased . As I 
have argued elsewhere, however, if the legislature writes a vague law and 
empowers an agency to interpret and enforce it, the demand for legislative 
ombudsman services is thereby increased (Fiorina, 19 77) . Of course, the 
legal alternative offers some opportunities for legislators . They can 
propose amendments to the law, but majorities of two chambers and the 
executive must go along, They can file a brief with the court, but they 
have little leverage over a judge . The administrative alternative clearly 
offers more extensive opportunities for legislators to facilitate their 
constituents' dealings with the regulatory process . The administrator can 
receive a friendly phone call, an invitation to appear before the 
subcommittee, a line item budget cut, etc .  Other things equal the 
administrative alternative allows legislators to transform potential legal 
fees into potential electoral support .1 9  In the formulation previously 
used, 
Lj(x) = bj (x) - cj (x) + fJ (x) 
Aj (x) = bj (x) - cj (x) + f; (x) } 
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where fi and f; signify facilitation benefits t o  the legislator from the 
legal and administrative alternatives, respectively . Thus, this model 
produces an across the board preference for the administrative process, 
ceteris paribus, without assuming that legislators escape full 
responsibility for the consequences of their decisions (the model is 
formally identical to the decision costs model) . Roger Noll and I have used 
the rent-seeking notion as an element in a more general explanation of why 
government policies are excessively bureaucratized (Fiorina and Noll, 1 97 8) .  
Delegation as Ideology 
Theodore Lowi's (1 979) brilliant indictment of contemporary American 
government includes as an important special case a condemnation of 
Congressional delegation of power to regulatory agencies . Lowi's objection 
is not to delegation in principle, but to delegation without standards, a 
practice he attributes to widespread acceptance of the public philosophy of 
''interest group liberalism . '' The latter ''• sees as both necessary 
and good a policy agenda that is accessible to all organized interests and 
makes no independent judgment of their claims • • •  it defines the public 
interest as the amalgamation of various claims (Lowi, 1 97 9, p, 51), Lowi 
sees interest group liberalism as the public philosophy which underpins 
modern American politics, It constitutes a perversion of a descriptive 
model -- pluralism 
pluralist politics 
into a normative justification for various features of 
bargaining, log-rolling, and veto-groups, for example . 
Under interest group liberalism government becomes simply one among many 
interest groups, and if flexibility, bargaining and compromise are desirable 
(ie. system-maintaining) for interest group politics in general, they are 
desirable for government as well . In Lowi's words (197 9 ,  p .  63) , interest 
group liberalism 
• • •  impairs legitimacy by converting.government from a moralistic 
to a mechanistic institution . It impairs the potential of 
positive law to correct itself by allowing the law to become 
anything that eventually bargains itself out as acceptable to the 
bargainers . It impairs the very process of administration itself 
by delegating to administration alien material -- policies that 
are not laws and authorizations that must be made into policies , 
Interest-group liberalism seeks pluralistic government, in which 
there is no formal specification of means or of ends . In a 
pluralistic government there is, therefore, no substance . 
Neither is there procedure , There is only process . 
Clearly, Lowi's explanation of legislative reliance on the 
administrative process differs from those previously discussed, He views 
political actors as moved by the power of ideas . Political practices and 
choices reflect acceptance of an ideology or philosophy which justifies 
those practices and choices . Much of Lowi's analysis is compelling; his 
description of the pathologies of American politics and government is 
unsurpassed . From a purely scientifi� standpoint, however, there is a 
question about the necessity of his explanation . Are politicians moved by 
their philosophies? Or do their philosophies rationalize that which their 
self-interest dictates? As we have seen, there are a number of self­
interested reasons for legislators to delegate regulatory authority . Does 
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interest group liberalism provide a n  additional explanation, or i s  it 
rhetorical cloth which enshrouds naked interest? 
Uncertainty Models 
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Uncertainty is a pervasive theme, or collection of themes, in the 
literature on regulatory origin, On the one hand, potential regulatees may 
regard regulation as a means of reducing the uncertainties inherent in 
market competition, This is the view developed by Owen and Braeutigam 
( 1 97 8) in their analysis of the regulatory process, but also a view which 
appears frequently in the historical literature . Discussions of the 
creation of the FTC for example, emphasize the extent to which businessmen 
saw the commission as a means of reducing their uncertainty about what 
constituted illegal business practices, though it should be noted that their 
uncertainty in part stemmed from inconsistent applications of existing 
government regulation such as the Sherman Act . 
On the other hand, regulation itself involves uncertainty . Because 
regulation is a process which operates through time, various kinds of social 
economic and technological change may impinge on that process and later its 
outcomes, We have thus far assumed, and will continue to assume that this 
kind of uncertainty is somehow reflected in the net benefit functions . 
After all, such uncertainty is no different from that which investors in a 
completely unregulated economy must deal with in making their decisions.  
What I will address in this section is a second variety of actor 
uncertainty that arises from the political process itself.  Whereas 
uncertainty about future developments requires judgments about the actual 
impact of x• (the level of regulation adopted) as the world changes, process 
uncertainty demands calculations about the actual level of regulation 
imposed, given that the legislature has ch osen x• , In other words, 
implementation of a regulatory decision is itself a highly uncertain 
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process, particularly in the pre-regulat ory stage , Perhaps there was little 
uncertainty about what the ICC would do with the Transportation Act of 1 940 , 
but what it would do with the Act of 1 887 was n ot so obvious . Haney ' s  
(1 91 0) discussion of Senate debate on the short haul-long haul provision of 
the ICA exquisitely illuminates a situation of legislator uncertainty . The 
Conference Report provided that railroads could n ot charge more for a short 
haul between two points than was charged f or the same distance embedded in a 
long haul where ' ' substantially similar circumstances and c onditions ' '  
prevailed (the commission c ould suspend the provision ' ' in special cases ' '  
upon investigation). Comments Haney (1 91 0, pp , 3 06-3 07) : 
There was great confusion in the minds of congressmen as to the 
exact significance of the long-and-short-haul clause . ' 'Where 
one member says, ' I  will vote f or that phraseology, because it 
means so and s o; ' and an other says, ' I  will vote f or it means 
exactly the reverse, ' I say in that case there is n ot that 
consensus of legislative intention which makes the proper 
enactment of law, • •  The most serious haziness occurred with 
regard to the phrase, ' ' substantially similar conditions , ' '  Did 
competition in any form constitute a condition? Did export 
trade? There was a determined effort to get an expression of 
opinion on this p oint from the Senate c onferees , but these 
gentlemen stated that the interpretation of the measure was a 
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matter for the courts t o  decide and that each member in voting 
was to c onsider what he thought the courts ' interpretation would 
be [emphasis added ] ,  
Clearly, n o  member of the U . S . Senate in 1 887 knew for certain exactly what 
level of regulation would result from passage of the Interstate Commerce 
Act . 
The standard way of treating such uncertainties is t o  generalize the 
notion of a legislative proposal from a certain to an uncertain prospect . 
Thus, a legislat or regards a proposal that an agency should regulate at a 
level, x•, as the uncertain prospect, �·. where 
a '  
Jx x q(x)dx
xa 
The legislator believes that the agency will transform the proposed 
regulation, x
*
, int o some level of regulation in the interval, (xa, xa '), 
those beliefs reflecting his subjective probability distribution, q(x) , 
If we assume that legislators have Von Neuman Morgenstern utility 
functions increasing in (b (x) - c (x)), then f or any arbitrary legislator, 
• uj (A (x ) ) 
As a first cut let us assume the following : 
(1) E (  q( x)) • x 
(2) q(x) is distributed symmetrically 
(3) L (x *) = x *, u . ( L (x
* > >  • 
J 
uj (x ) 
about • x 
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(ie ,  the legal alternativ e is viewed as riskless) 
Not a great deal can be said about the specifics of collective choice amon g 
uncertain prospects , but the situation just constructed is one of the 
exceptions . Shepsle (1972) has proved a theorem which translated into our 
terminology states that if a majority of legisla.tors is risk-acceptant in 
some interval about x• , .!!!I: prospect with expectation at x• defeats x• . The 
following figure shows the familia r situation for a single decision-maker .  
0 
* 
x 
- u .  (x)
J 
1 00 %  
The obvious question then , is who is likely to be risk-acceptant i n  the 
neighborhood of x•? This question takes us willy-nilly into the realm of 
functional forms , but in an exploratory spirit let us go on , If we assume 
that each legislator has the same bell-shaped utility function symmetric 
about his individual ma ximum, x; , then each legislator will be risk­
acceptant in the a rea of proposals ' ' far from ' ' his maximum : 20 
* 
0 x . 100% 
J 
Thus , if the legislature appears to be gravitating toward some median 
preferred level of regulation , x• , this formulation suggests that 
legislators who regard the median as significantly ' ' too little ' '  or ' ' too 
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much ' '  would be most likely t o  support a n  administrative form of regulation . 
Conversely , those whose ideal points a re near the median would be most 
likely to support a legal form . 
Several interesting substantive implications accompany this very 
tentative theoretical proposition . For one thing ,  those who propound very 
different models of the future operation of the regulatory process may not 
be in disa greement so much as emphasizing possibilities differentially 
impo rtant to them . P rogressive elements who favored stronger regulation 
than actually passed , and industry interests who favored weaker may each 
have been willing to gamble (and try to convince those similar to them to 
gamble) on the possibility that administrative regulation would produce an 
outcome closer to their ideal than the legal proposals which were the 
alternative, Under this interpretation Progressives were not naive and 
stupid , just players of a long-shot who lost . 
A second implication is that uncertainty considerations may drive 
legislators in a direction different from SR considerations under some 
circumstances . Take a situation in which the expected net benefits of 
regulation order legislators in the same fashion as preferred level of 
regulation (I have no idea of the empirical likelihood of this condition 
holdin g), In such a situation the SR model predicts that administrative 
preferences prevail from the negative end of the ordering to somewhere past 
the median,  whereas the simple uncertainty model developed above predicts 
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that both ends of the ordering will show administr ativ e pref erences ag ainst 
the legal preferences expressed by the middle ,  Techniques for scaling 
Congressional roll call votes provide the te chnology for an examination of 
such hypotheses, providing that we can find some means of approximating the 
net benefits to dist ricts and st ates . 
The major problem with th e simple formul ation just discussed is that 
the liter ature contains abundant evidence th at jud gments about the future 
op er ation of the re gul atory process are anything but unbiased . Predictions 
abound, but they tend to be eith e r  dire or rosy, seldom neutral .  In th e 
case of the ICC, for example, numerous railroad represent atives took a 
s an guine view of the possibilities of d e aling with the new commission . The 
position of Richard Olney, a rail road lawyer who l ater b e came Clevel and's 
Attorney Gene r al is relatively common, though not universal . As paraphrased 
by Hoogenboom and Hoogenboom (1 976 , p ,  3 3), Olney argued (1 892) 
that ''the part of wisdom is not to destroy the Commission but to 
utilize it .'' Olney stressed that an attempt to destroy the ICC 
would p rob ably fail and might backfire by inspiring efforts to 
st ren gthen the commission, Since the ICC h as recently b e en 
limited by the courts, he emphasized that its supervision was 
'' almost entirely nominal'' while it s atisfied the ''popular 
cl amor'' for regulation and could be useful to r ail roads , As th e 
commission grew old er, Olney further su ggested it would ''take 
the business and r ailroad view of things'' and p rotect r ailroad 
corpo rations from ''hasty and crude legislation'' as well as from 
th e peopl e .  
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Olney was not alone in his judgment . The Grange opposed the cr e ation of the 
ICC on the b asis of beliefs simil ar to Olney's . Jud ge Re agan himself s aid 
in debate (Cushman, 1 941 , p .  5 2) :  
I sh all fear th at the railroad int erests will combine their power 
to control the appointment of the commissione rs in their own 
int erest . We all underst and how easy it is for a f ew p ersons 
controlling large int erests to unite their influen ce to carry out 
their wishes . The notorious f acts as to how r ailroad 
managers h ave corruptly controlled L e gislatures, courts, 
governors, and Congress in the past give us sufficient w arning as 
to what may be expected of them in th e future • • •
Myriad comments like the preceding suggest that in gene r al E ( q( x)) f x• . 
What consequences flow from this modification of our simple formul ation? 
Consider the c ase in which E(q(x) > x•: 
0 
* 
x x 
::--------- more regulation desired
100 
It se ems that in this c ase our earlier conclusion is reinforced for those 
who desire � regul ation i e .  the expected utility of the risky alte rnative 
(administ rative) e xce eds the utility of x• by an even l arge r amount th an 
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when q (x) is symmetrically distributed about x• . In contrast , the 
conclusion no longer holds for those wh'.' desire less regulation . Now 
consider the case where E ( q( x)) < x• : 
less regulation 
desired ----� 
0 x 
. ��- more regulation desired 
* 
x 1 00 
In this case those who want l ess regulation than x
• 
are even more likely to 
prefer the risky administrative alternativ e than in the symmetric case , 
whereas those who prefer a higher level of regulation may now opt for the 
l e gal alternative. 
What we see  then is that wishful thinking or an optimistic outlook 
reinforces our preceding conclusions : if you want more regulation (less 
regulation) and believe that an agency would be likely to regulate more than 
(less than) • x , the administrativ e alternative looks r elatively more 
attractive .  Given the experience of railroads with state commissions prior 
to 1 886 , they are 1 ikely to have had a rather optimistic outlook about their 
prospects under a commission . In contrast , a pessimistic or paranoid 
outlook vitiates our earlier conclusion : if you want more regulation (less 
re gulation), and believe that an a gency would be likely to do l ess than 
(mor e than) x• , the legal alternativ e looks relatively mor e attractiv e .
Given their experience with state commissions the Grangers opt ed for the 
law : 
The people want no boa rd of railroad commissioners . They want 
j ust and wholesome laws , with well defined provisions for 
enforcing them , • , We want an absolute law , if you can 
consistently give it to us , and we do not want our j ustice 
strained though a commission, because our experience with a 
commission • •  , is that they are not only worthless , but worse 
than worthless ( quoted in Cushman , 1 941 , p, 50) , 
The next st ep obviously would be to allow the legal alternative to 
be a risk too . Thus , 
l' x J 1 xp (x)d x x 
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A natural starting assumption might be that both p (x) and q ( x) are 
distributed symmetrically about x• , and that the variance of p is less than 
the variance of q .  A s  yet, I have not found anything in the technical 
literature which speaks to this case ,  
Summary 
A paper like this does not lend itself to conclusions . The unifyin g 
theme of the paper is a question : when and why does Congress choose to 
modify social and/or economic b ehavior by establishing a regulatory a gency 
rather than by writing a law to be enforced in the courts? This is a 
special case of the more gen eral question of why politicians delegate their 
power to administrators , I have not sought to answer that question in any 
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definite way; rather, I have tried t o  identify some of the potential 
answers, most of which are mutually compatible, all of which have some 
support in the literature, and few of which have been dealt with 
systematically by modern political economists, I have ignored certain 
an swer s that appear in the literature -- the complexity of modern problem s ,  
the demands on legislator time, and so  forth . These may have some effect on 
what Congre s s  decide s t o  delegate, but in the main I believe they are 
largely rationalization s which scholar s are too quick t o  believe . Where 
politicians have the incentive, they manage to deal with complexity, and 
they find the time to do it . It is our job t o  identify those incentives and 
trace their implication s  for the formation of public policy in this country . 
Without denigrating the w ork that ha s been done, it is fair to say that our 
work is only beginning, de spite the extravagant claims of some author s t o  
the contrary . 
FOOTNOTES 
1 .  The Congres sional predilection for regulatory agencie s is a genuine 
stylized fact . In addition to Allan Meltzer, who commis sioned this 
paper, Buchanan and Tullock believe that 
Econ omist s of divergent political per sua sion s agree on the 
superior efficacy of penalty taxe s as in strumen t s  for 
controlling significant external disecon omie s which involve 
the interaction of many partie s, However, political leader s 
and bureaucratic admini strator s, charged with d oin g 
something about these problem s, appear to favor direct 
controls (1 975 , p .  1 3 9) .  
And Charle s Schultze, who take s a more sanguine view of government 
intervention than do Meltzer, Buchanan .and Tullock comments 
But our political sy stem almost alway s choose s  the command­
and-control re spon se and seldom trie s the other alternative, 
regardles s  of whether that mode of respon se fit s the problem 
(1977 , p .  1 3) .  
2 .  Defining regulation in term s of the administrative proce s s  i s  the 
preference of many econ omist s who work in the area , Schultze, for 
example, notes that ' ' The virtually univer sal characteristic of public 
policy in these circum stance s [externalities -- MF] i s  to start from 
the conclusion that regulation is the obviou s an swer ; the pricing 
alternative is never c on sidered ' '  (197 7 ,  p ,  47) , Similarly, N oll 
( 1 979) argues that the most useful definition of regulation involves a 
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focu s on bureaucrat ic auth or it ie s  operat ing in accord w ith procedural 
rule s such as those codif ied in the Admini strative P rocedures Act . 
3 .  St igler (1971 ) adopts a similarly broa d  view of economic regulat i on, 
spec if ically including exc i se taxe s  (whi skey, play ing cards } ,  import 
quota s ,  protective tariffs ,  some sub s i d ie s ,  and d irect leg i slat ive 
enactment s which advantage one economic intere st v i s-a-vis other s .  
4 .  Of Sherman, Cu shman (1941 , p .  1 7 7 )  write s : 
Th i s  was a d i sc ipl inary mea sure de s i gne d  to forb id and 
pun i sh .  I n  its leg i slat ive h i st ory wa s no sugge st ion that 
its enforcement be g iven t o  an independent admini strative 
agency patterne d  after the three-year-old Inter state 
C ommerce C omm i s s i on .  The proh ib it ions of the Act were made 
ab solute , and the Department of Just ice and the court s were 
charged w ith its execut ion. 
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5 .  Th i s  d ich ot omizat i on of the adm inistrative and legal systems i s  an 
admitted over- s impl if icat ion, In contemporary America the enforcement 
of few public policies i s  left ent irely to the init iat ive of the 
indiv idual lit igant ;  admini strat ive involvement i s  the rule . 
Conver sely , even where the adm ini strative system ha s primary 
re spons ib il ity for the enforcement of a statute , the court s loom in the 
background, Some would contend that th i s  real ity v it iates the 
usefulne s s  of the d i st inct i on I have drawn. 
I am sensitive to such argument s but would offer two comment s in 
reply . F i rst ,  the argument s reflect a contemporary, if not an 
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ah i st orical per spect ive . At one t ime the d ich otomy wa s clearly 
perceived and was the ba s i s  for maj or polit ical confl ict ( see note 6 
below} . If , as the year s  went by, delegat i on of legi slat ive power to 
administ rat or s became ea s ier ( ie .  le s s  controver sial} , and seemingly 
more ' ' natural , ' '  the h i st orical que st i on remains : what factors led to 
increa sed rel iance on the admini strative proce s s? Second, even if 
hi storical evidence of a political choice between administ rative and 
legal forms of regulat i on were not in evidence , the log ical que st i on 
would remain:  why not attempt t o  regulate w ithout rel iance on 
bureaucrat ic ent itie s? The sc ient if ic status of th i s  quest i on i s  no 
different from that w ith which th i s  paper began : why are log ically 
po s s ible though empi rically unt r ie d  "market-like" mechan i sms not 
adopted a s  regulatory instrument s? In e ither ca se it i s  a meaningful 
que st ion to a sk what factor s unde rl ie the contemporary rel iance on the 
admini st rative agency for the implementat i on of collect ive dec i s i ons, 
6 .  A ga in,  Cushman (1941 , p, 45 ) observes : 
The f ir st maj or problem and also the last which confronted 
those working for the federal regulat ion of railways wa s 
whether or not a comm i s s i on should be set up to adm ini ster 
the law . It wa s generally agreed that federal control had 
become imperat ive, but th ose support ing such control were 
div i de d  int o  two camps .  The f irst ,  led by Judge Reagan of 
Texa s ,  and chairman of the H ou se C omm ittee on Inter state and 
Fore i gn C ommerce , demanded drast ic regulat i on by statute to 
be enforced directly by the Department of Just ice and the 
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c ourts . Rea gan was  able to carry the House w ith h im d own t o  
the very last . The other group, headed by Senator Cullom , a 
former governor of Illino i s  in s i sted that federal regulat i on 
of railways should be adm ini stered through a comm i s s i on set 
up f or that purpo se . Thi s  vital d ifference of opin i on 
per s i sted throughout the en t ire per iod of d i scu s s i on and wa s 
only adjusted , a s  we have seen , in conference comm ittee a 
few weeks  before the actual passa ge of the Act of 1 8 87 . 
7 .  M itn ick ' s  (1980) exhaust ive survey of the l iterature on regulat i on 
conta ins a 162 page chapter on regulatory or i g in .  The chapter i s  short 
on summary and synthe s i s ,  a lack which appear s  t o  reflect the state of 
the l iterature more than the failing of the author . 
8 .  In another work (Kolko,  1963) general izes h i s  the s i s  t o  other 
regulat ory interventon s  of the Progre s s ive era such a s  the 
establi shment of the Federal Trade Comm i s s i on and the Federal Re serve 
System . 
9 .  Order ing S seems at f ir st glance empir ically unlikely . Actually, it 
might be r ather common where the log ical cu st od ian of a new regulatory 
mandate i s  an ex i st in g  agency unfriendly to the soon-to-be-affected 
part ie s .  In recent years,  for· example , env ironment al i st s  have been 
somewhat choosy about the bureaucratic enforcer s of env ironmental law s; 
bu s ine s s  intere st s too are not unconcerned about such dec i s i on s .  
1 0 .  Spann and Erick s on (1970) and Zerbe (1980) d iffer over the welfare 
effects of ICC regulat i on a s  of 1 890 . Even if we accept Zerbe ' s  
content ion that the effect s were pos itive , however, we are not 
log ically driven t o  a public interest explanat i on of the 1 887 Act . 
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11 . In explor ing the l iterature on regulat ory or i g in I am struck by the 
extent t o  which many econom i st s  (see H ilton , 1 96 6 ,  for a notable 
except i on) unnece s sarily burden themselves w ith str ict adherence to 
what one m ight call the princ iple of intent i onal ity : whatever exi st s  
wa s deliberately planned by some pivotal actor . At the ind iv idual 
level intent ional ity is the l inchpin of modern polit ical economy, but 
it is a fallacy to tran sfer that princ iple to the c ollect ive level . We 
now know that in the abstr act maj or ity rule has l ittle in the way of 
con s i stency, let alone respon s ivene s s  propert ie s (eg ,  McKelvey , 1 97 9) .  
Even in the special ca se s in which maj or ity rule i s  well-behaved ( ie, 
s ingle-peaked preferences in the unid imen s i onal ca se) common political 
inst itut i on s  may deflect the proce s s  from the theoretically expected 
outcome (eg, Romer and Rosenthal, 1978) .  Only the m o st na ive v iew of 
the democratic polit ical proce s s  po stulate s any nece s sary 
corre spondence between polit ical outcome s and the de s ires of any 
part icular actor . 
1 2 .  A s  I w ill ment i on in connect i on w ith the uncerta inty model below, 
however, pol it ical act or s were aware that court dec i s i on s  would 
determ ine the resolut ion of amb igu ities in the law of 1 887 . 
1 3 , N ote that the leg i sl at or m ight adopt such an objective funct i on for 
several d ifferent rea s on s .  Most obviously , one might suppo se that 
probability of re-election is directly rela ted to the ne t benefits 
procured by the legislator . But even a selfless legislator might 
decide that the proper function of the dutiful representa tive is to 
maximize district ne t benefits . Thus, interest and duty may be 
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mutually reinforcing for the individual legisla tor, though this is not 
to say tha t the sum total of individually maximizing legisla tors would 
produce collec tively desirable outcomes . For an analysis of the 
disj unction see Weingast, Shepsle , and Johnsen, ( 1980) , 
1 4 .  See for example, S tigler ( 1 971) , Posner ( 1 974) .  In terestingly, though, 
public interest models continually re-emerge in the literature, eg , 
Levine ( 1 9 80) , Zerbe and Urban ( 1 980) . Even some VPI scholars do not 
completely dismiss public interest l•otions (Mackay and Reid, 1 97 9) .  
1 5 . The full P rogressive litany is summarized by Mitnick ( 1 9 80 ,  p .  3 1) :  
the administ ra tive agency - - whe ther bureau o r  commission 
is supposed to be characterized by expertise in its 
managers/heads and staff, who a re able to give full-time 
a t ten tion to oversight of the regulated a rea ; capability to 
handle large numbers of cases rapidly and relatively 
economically th rough specialization of function; continuity 
of policy through continuity of personnel and insti tutional 
existence and ac tions, and ability to plan ; flexibility in 
its ability to respond to changing environmen tal and 
technological conditions ;  absence of political distortions 
through independence and judicialization of its procedures ; 
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and represen ta tion of the public and other interested 
parties th rough procedures like public hearings and staff 
representa tion of the public interest . 
16 . Bear in mind that given a proposed level of regulation, x, all ne t 
losers would p refer tha t it be implemen ted through the administra tive 
process .  This is not to say tha t they would suppor t  the level of 
regula tion, x, however .  The question of the ultimate choice of level 
and form of regulation by the legisla ture is considered in the text 
below . 
17 . This interpreta tion of the amendmen t process is no t woven out of whole 
cloth . I t  is ac tually a reasonably fai thful, if highly simplified, 
description of the legislative histories of the House and Sena te bills 
of 1 887 . 
1 8 .  The third na tural question, when is the winner, x • or x
•
• positive, is 
implicitly answered in this formulation . Tha t is, L (x
•
) defea ts all 
• •• amendmen t including L ( O) if x r 0, and similarly for A (x ). Thus, if
the winner L (x
•
) or A (x
**
> p rovides for a positive level of regulation, 
tha t will be the choice of the legisla ture . 
1 9 .  Actually, given the j udicialization of agency proceedings and the 
complexity of administ ra tive law, it may well be tha t the 
administra tive alternative allows legisla tors and lawyers to play a 
cooperative posi tive-sum game . 
20 . For legisla tors whose ideal points a re near the extremes of no 
regula tion or complete nationaliza tion , a ssume a trunca ted u tility 
function such a s  
o r
0 
50 
100% 
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